In 1979, two psychologists publish an article in a journal for economists. It shows that people do not weigh gains and losses equally, and in doing so it changes the image of the rational decision-maker.
Two circles of equal size, one with a plus, one with a minus, lie at the ends of a horizontal line balanced on a small triangle, and the line tips clearly toward the circle with the minus. Then the line becomes a kinked curve, rising gently to the right and falling steeply to the left, and a gold dot as the reference point moves along it and shifts what counts as a gain and what counts as a loss.
Principle #82
Loss Aversion: A loss hurts more than an equal gain pleases, and that is why people fight harder for what they have than for what they could get.
4 min read5 sectionsSituationLink to the principle
Contents
For a long time, economics worked with a simple picture: people weigh their options, calculate the expected utility and choose the best one. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky doubted this. They presented participants with simple choices about bets and lotteries and looked at what they actually chose. The result did not fit the theory. Their observations gave rise to one of the most influential principles of behavioral research: Loss Aversion.
Two dots of equal size fall into the water; the loss sends golden ripples twice as far as the gain – as with Kahneman and Tversky.
01
Two psychologists and a gap in the theory
Situation
Kahneman and Tversky had worked closely together since the late 1960s. In March 1979, their article “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk” appeared in the journal Econometrica (Volume 47, Issue 2, pages 263 to 292). In it, they show that expected utility theory, which was dominant at the time, does not describe actual behavior under risk well. They propose a model of their own: prospect theory.
Link to the principle
Loss aversion was not dreamed up at a desk. It was observed. The principle describes how people actually decide, not how they should decide. That is precisely why it is so valuable for strategy: it tells you how the other side will react.
02
The reference point decides
Situation
The core of the theory: people do not evaluate outcomes in terms of their final wealth but as gains or losses relative to a reference point. Usually, that is the status quo. The value curve is flatter for gains and steeper for losses. A loss of €100 therefore weighs more heavily than a gain of €100.
Link to the principle
If the reference point determines what counts as a loss, then the reference point itself is contested. Whoever sets it shapes what the other side perceives as a loss. A price increase presented as “a discount that no longer applies” has a different effect from a “surcharge.” The number is the same; the feeling is not.
03
Safe with gains, risky with losses
Situation
In the experiments, most participants facing gains preferred a sure amount to a bet with a slightly higher expected value. With losses, the pattern reversed. Many preferred a bet that risked an even greater loss to a sure, smaller loss. Kahneman and Tversky called this mirror image the reflection effect.
Link to the principle
This leads to a rule that matters for strategy: people in the red become risk-seeking. If you don’t want to accept a loss, you go for broke to undo it. This explains behavior on the stock market, in corporate crises and in conflicts. An opponent who feels like a loser is not weaker but often more dangerous.
04
About twice as heavy
Situation
In a later paper, published in 1992, Tversky and Kahneman put a number on the difference. By their estimates, losses weigh about twice as much as gains of the same size. In his book “Thinking, Fast and Slow,” Kahneman describes a simple test: a coin is tossed. If it lands on one side, you lose $100; if it lands on the other, you win $150. Even though the bet makes money on average, most people turn it down. Related to this is the endowment effect, which Kahneman studied with Jack Knetsch and Richard Thaler in 1990: people who are given a coffee mug demand considerably more for it than others are willing to pay for the same mug.
Link to the principle
For negotiations, this is central. Every concession feels like a loss to the side that makes it and is therefore valued more highly than the other side values it. Both sides consider their own offer generous and the other side’s stingy. If you know this, you frame your proposals so that the other side loses less, or you offer compensation that cushions the loss.
05
Impact and limits
Situation
In 2002, Daniel Kahneman received the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences, in part for prospect theory. Amos Tversky had died in 1996 and could no longer be honored. Kahneman died in 2024. For some years now, the scope of loss aversion has been debated. In 2018, the researchers David Gal and Derek D. Rucker argued that it applies less generally than is often claimed, for example with small amounts.
Link to the principle
A principle does not become weaker when you know its limits. Loss aversion is a strong tendency, not a law of nature. It is at work above all when things are at stake that people already regard as their own: possessions, status, habits, rights.
Key takeaways
Key lessons
01
Ask yourself what the other party regards as their status quo.
02
Phrase changes so that they don’t look like a loss when they aren’t one.
03
Keep in mind that people in the red take more risks.
04
Assess your own concessions soberly: they feel bigger than they are.
05
Treat loss aversion as a tendency, not a law.
Summary
In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky showed that people evaluate outcomes as gains or losses relative to a reference point and give losses considerably more weight. With gains, they are cautious; with losses, they are risk-seeking. For strategy, this means: if you understand and shape the reference point, you also understand what people fight for and when they risk everything.
Sources
Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky: Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. In: Econometrica 47 (1979), No. 2, pp. 263–292. Econometric Society
Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman: Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty. In: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5 (1992), pp. 297–323.
Daniel Kahneman: Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011 (German edition: Schnelles Denken, langsames Denken. Munich: Siedler 2012).
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, Richard H. Thaler: Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem. In: Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990), pp. 1325–1348.
David Gal, Derek D. Rucker: The Loss of Loss Aversion. In: Journal of Consumer Psychology 28 (2018), pp. 497–516.
Back to the basics
Read what lies behind Loss Aversion: with explanation, animation, video and research.