Contents
Many war films show only one side. “Tora! Tora! Tora!” is built differently. The American scenes were directed by Richard Fleischer, the Japanese ones by Toshio Masuda and Kinji Fukasaku. Akira Kurosawa was originally supposed to direct the Japanese part but was replaced after a short time. So the viewer sees by turns how the attack is planned and how the warnings peter out on the other side – an example of Surprise.
A plan that relies on surprise
Situation
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto wants to knock out the American Pacific Fleet with a single blow. Minoru Genda works out the attack, and Mitsuo Fuchida is to lead it in the air. The film shows the preparation as sober planning in which everything depends on the opponent suspecting nothing.
Link to the principle
For the weaker side, surprise is often the only chance of superiority. Yamamoto’s plan does not count on a long fight against a watchful fleet but on a moment when it is unprepared.
The United States is reading along
Situation
American intelligence has broken the Japanese diplomatic code. Washington is reading confidential messages. But the information passes through many hands, is assessed in different ways and does not reach the commanders in Hawaii, Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short, in time.
Link to the principle
Surprise does not require the opponent to know nothing. It requires the opponent not to turn its knowledge into action. The film shows an organization in which everyone knows a piece and nobody knows the whole.
Warnings nobody takes seriously
Situation
On the morning of the attack, a radar station picks up approaching aircraft, but the duty officer dismisses the report. The destroyer USS Ward reports that it has sunk a midget submarine; the report is treated as unimportant. A long Japanese note to the U.S. government arrives too late. The warning from Washington reaches Kimmel and Short only hours after the attack.
Link to the principle
Any one of these warnings would have been enough. Together they were lost, because each one could be explained away on its own. Surprise often arises not from missing signals but from many small reasons not to believe them.
The signal for complete success
Situation
When the Japanese planes reach Pearl Harbor and meet no resistance, Fuchida radios the code word “Tora! Tora! Tora!” to signal that surprise has been achieved. The film shows the attack in elaborate flying sequences, for which it won the Academy Award for Best Special Visual Effects.
Link to the principle
The fact that there was a code word of its own for a successful surprise shows how heavily the plan depended on it. The value of a surprise attack is measured by how much the opponent cannot do at the decisive moment.
What comes after the surprise
Situation
At the end, the film has Yamamoto say, “I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.” The line is often attributed to him, but there is no written record of it. Historically, the United States entered the war after the attack and mobilized its entire industry.
Link to the principle
Surprise brings a temporary superiority. If you use it to strike an opponent who is stronger in the long run, you win a day and risk the war. The principle applies to the moment, not to the whole.
Key takeaways
Key lessons
- Surprise does not need your silence but the other side’s hesitation.
- If everyone knows only a piece, nobody sees the danger.
- Take seriously warnings that can be explained away one by one.
- Before any surprise, ask what will happen the day after.
- The advantage of the first blow is no substitute for strategy.
Summary
“Tora! Tora! Tora!” tells the story of Pearl Harbor from both sides. Japan plans a blow that works only if the U.S. fleet is unprepared. The United States has clues and is even reading along, but the warnings peter out in an organization in which nobody sees the whole. The surprise succeeds completely. The film ends with the question of what it achieved in the long run.
Sources
- Roberta Wohlstetter: Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Stanford: Stanford University Press 1962.
- Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege (in German). Berlin: Ferdinand Dümmler 1832, Book III, Chapter 9.
