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Example of the principleOODA Loop (#25)

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James Carville, the War Room and the OODA Loop

In the 1992 presidential campaign, James Carville and George Stephanopoulos set up a “war room” for Bill Clinton in Little Rock. Its purpose: to answer every attack so quickly that the response still makes it into the same news cycle. The opponent is meant to be constantly reacting to a situation that has already changed again.

Two circles of four arc segments lie side by side, and in each a dot runs around the circle: on the left a fast golden one, on the right a slow mist-blue one. Each time the golden dot reaches its Act field, a grid of dots in the middle shifts, and the slow dot aims at a spot that no longer exists. Then the image zooms into the Orient field: several rings lie there like lenses, and one distorted lens sends even the fast dot into empty space.
Principle #25

OODA Loop: If you perceive faster, read the situation more accurately, decide and act, you shape events while the other side is still reacting to the last situation.

4 min read5 sectionsSituationLink to the principle
Contents

In a campaign, which story a day tells is often decided within a few hours. If you answer too late, you find yourself in a situation others have already defined. In 1992, Bill Clinton’s campaign team drew a conclusion from this that is still followed today. It is easy to understand through John Richard Boyd’s OODA Loop: observe, orient, decide, act, and do it all faster than the opponent.

In a row of news cycles, a white spike is followed by a golden one within the same field – like Carville’s war room in 1992.
In a row of news cycles, a white spike is followed by a golden one within the same field – like Carville’s war room in 1992.

The lesson of 1988

Situation
Four years earlier, Democrat Michael Dukakis had lost the presidential election to George H. W. Bush. By many accounts, he had left the other side’s attacks unanswered for too long. James Carville, the Clinton campaign’s chief strategist, later said that the Democrats had been scarred by that defeat. They did not want merely to react; they wanted to go on the attack themselves.
Link to the principle
Boyd describes how a side whose cycle is too slow falls apart. It acts on the basis of a situation that no longer exists. The Clinton campaign had this experience in mind and built its organization around precisely this risk.

A room for fast decisions

Situation
At campaign headquarters in Little Rock, Arkansas, Carville and communications director George Stephanopoulos set up the war room. Carville describes it as an apparatus meant to react quickly and decide quickly in order to keep the momentum. He had observed that news cycles had become much more compressed. By his account, about 85% of the decisions about a day’s coverage had been made by 2:30 p.m. That is why he wanted the plan for the day settled by 9:30 a.m. local time.
Link to the principle
The war room is a machine for shortening the loop. Observation (What is running in the media?), orientation (What does it mean?), decision and action happen in one room, with short lines of communication. Carville knew the window of time in which an answer still has an effect, and set the rhythm accordingly.

The Gennifer Flowers crisis

Situation
In January 1992, allegations of an affair between Clinton and Gennifer Flowers become public. George Stephanopoulos calls Carville early in the morning and summons him to the airport. The campaign wants to put itself at the center of the story rather than let it run its course. Bill and Hillary Clinton respond in an interview on “60 Minutes” after the Super Bowl.
Link to the principle
If you act quickly, you help determine how a situation is interpreted. The campaign does not wait until others have told the story. It puts its own interpretations into circulation while the media’s orientation is still open.

The draft letter

Situation
Shortly afterward, Clinton comes under pressure over his conduct regarding the draft during the Vietnam War. Carville speaks of a 17-point drop in the polls. The campaign decides to publish an old letter of Clinton’s on the subject itself. On the television program “Nightline,” the entire letter is read aloud before Clinton answers questions. Carville said later that the campaign got more good out of the letter than the letter did it harm.
Link to the principle
Instead of having new pieces of a story wrested from it again and again, the campaign discloses the material itself. In doing so, it takes the initiative away from the opponent. The opponent now has to react to the campaign’s action, not the other way around.

Where speed becomes a trap

Situation
In the same context, the campaign claimed that Republicans had obtained the letter from the Pentagon. Carville said later that he had believed it at the time. It was not substantiated, and in his words it did not accomplish much either. The Oscar-nominated 1993 documentary “The War Room” by Chris Hegedus and D. A. Pennebaker portrays the campaign. Clinton wins the election in November 1992 against George H. W. Bush and Ross Perot.
Link to the principle
Speed tempts you to answer with the first argument at hand, even if it is not substantiated. A fast loop is only as good as its orientation. If you sacrifice truth to speed, you may win a day and lose trust.
Key takeaways

Key lessons

  1. Know the window of time in which your answer still has an effect.
  2. Bring observation and decision together in one place with short lines of communication.
  3. Disclose difficult matters yourself before others do.
  4. Answer in a way that forces the other side to react to you.
  5. Never sacrifice truth for speed.
Summary

The 1992 Clinton campaign drew the lesson from the 1988 defeat that slowness is fatal. With the war room, James Carville and George Stephanopoulos built an organization that answered attacks in hours instead of days. They watched the rhythm of the news, decided early and put their own interpretations into circulation before others did. That is the OODA Loop in politics. At the same time, the unsubstantiated Pentagon accusation shows its limit: speed without sound orientation costs credibility.

Sources
  • John Richard Boyd: Patterns of Conflict (briefing). 1986.
Back to the basics

Read what lies behind the OODA Loop: with explanation, animation, video and research.

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