Contents
In the Cold War, the world seemed divided into two camps: the West on one side, the communist states on the other. But the map was more complicated. China and the Soviet Union shared a long border and a great deal of mistrust. Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, saw in this an opportunity that follows the logic of the Mandala of States.
Two communist neighbors at odds
Situation
Since the late 1950s, the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union had drifted apart ideologically and politically. In March 1969, bloody clashes broke out between Chinese and Soviet soldiers on the Ussuri, the border river. The tensions helped push the Chinese leadership to seek a rapprochement with the United States.
Link to the principle
Neighbors with a common border easily fall into conflict, even when they share the same ideology. The mandala explains this not by worldview but by position: those who border on each other compete for security, influence and land.
The secret trip
Situation
In 1969, the two sides agreed to resume their ambassadorial talks. In 1971, Henry Kissinger traveled to Beijing twice. The first trip, in July, was kept strictly secret; only afterward did Nixon announce it publicly. The second followed in October 1971.
Link to the principle
Switching alliances according to the mandala requires caution. If you court your rival’s rival, you have to prevent the rival from reacting early and disrupting the rapprochement. The secrecy protected not only against the Soviet Union but also against resistance in their own camp.
A week in Beijing
Situation
From February 21 to 28, 1972, Richard Nixon visited the People’s Republic of China. He was the first sitting U.S. president to visit mainland China. He met Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. The visit ended with the Shanghai Communiqué. In it, the United States acknowledged that the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait see only one China, of which Taiwan is a part, and did not challenge this position.
Link to the principle
The two sides remained divided on many things; the communiqué even stated their differences openly. But they had one point in common: the Soviet Union. As in the mandala, such an alliance needs no friendship, only a common neighbor whom both fear.
Leverage against Moscow
Situation
According to the U.S. Department of State, U.S. officials hoped that better relations with communist governments in Asia would reduce future conflicts. A few months after the trip to China, in May 1972, Nixon traveled to Moscow. There, the two sides signed arms control agreements.
Link to the principle
The mandala works in both directions. Moscow now had to allow for its two great opponents reaching an understanding. If you ally with your rival’s neighbor, you change your rival’s own calculations.
What remained
Situation
In 1979, the United States and the People’s Republic of China established formal diplomatic relations. The U.S. Department of State notes that the rapprochement changed the Cold War and influenced the policy of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Link to the principle
A mandala is not a permanent state. It holds as long as the situation holds. With the end of the Soviet Union, the partnership lost its common opponent, and relations between the United States and China changed. So the principle also explains why such partnerships come to an end.
Key takeaways
Key lessons
- Look at who shares a border and a quarrel with your rival.
- A shared worldview does not protect neighbors from rivalry.
- Prepare a rapprochement discreetly.
- A partner beyond your rival changes how the rival behaves toward you.
- Be prepared for the alliance to end when the common rival disappears.
Summary
The Soviet Union and China were neighbors and rivals. Richard Nixon made use of this. With Kissinger’s secret trip in 1971 and his own visit to Beijing in 1972, he won his rival’s neighbor as a partner. That strengthened his hand against Moscow. The rapprochement follows the logic of the mandala: a shared situation counts for more than a shared ideology.
