The NATO Double-Track Decision and the Security Dilemma
In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union deploys new intermediate-range missiles; in 1979, NATO responds with the decision to station missiles of its own in Western Europe. Each side sees its own steps as protection and those of the other as preparation for an attack.
Two dots face each other; the left one draws a thin ring around itself, the right one answers with a thicker one, and with every ring the dots grow smaller and paler. At the turning point, a golden gate opens in the left ring, a golden line runs to the right dot, and both rings grow thinner.
Principle #61
Security Dilemma: What you do to protect yourself, your counterpart may read as a threat – and then you arm each other into insecurity.
4 min read5 sectionsSituationLink to the principle
Contents
The Security Dilemma is not a dispute between an aggressor and a defender. It is a trap that two defenders can fall into. Each wants to protect itself, and in doing so each increases the other’s insecurity. The missile crisis surrounding NATO’s Double-Track Decision is one of the clearest examples of this in recent German history.
On both sides of a border, columns grow in turn, while below them a second, golden track leads across – as with the NATO Double-Track Decision.
01
The SS-20
Situation
Starting in the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union deploys a new intermediate-range missile, called the SS-20 in the West. It is mobile, carries several warheads and can reach targets anywhere in Western Europe. In Moscow, it is regarded as a modernization of older missiles. Arms control treaties between the superpowers do not cover such weapons. In October 1977, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt calls in a speech in London for intermediate-range missiles to be included in arms control as well.
Link to the principle
What one side sees as renewal, the other sees as a new threat. Western Europe fears that the Soviet Union could use these missiles to blackmail Europe without directly threatening the United States. The intention behind a weapon cannot be seen from the outside, only its capability.
02
The two-part response
Situation
On December 12, 1979, NATO’s foreign and defense ministers in Brussels adopt a decision with two parts. It offers the Soviet Union negotiations on dismantling the SS-20. If these fail, American missiles are to be stationed in Western Europe starting in 1983: Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles. The talks in Geneva begin at the end of November 1981. A compromise worked out by the negotiators in 1982 is rejected by both governments.
Link to the principle
The Double-Track Decision is an attempt to get out of the dilemma: new arms only if negotiations fail. But in Moscow, the threat of deployment is itself perceived as a menace. Neither side trusts the other’s offer.
03
How Moscow reads the Pershing II
Situation
The Pershing II has a short flight time and is very accurate. According to a widespread account, the Soviet leadership fears that it could hit command centers in the western Soviet Union within a few minutes, before any response is possible. From the West’s point of view, the missile is a counterweight. From Moscow’s point of view, it is a first-strike weapon.
Link to the principle
Here the core of the Security Dilemma becomes visible. Many weapons can be used for deterrence as well as for attack. If it is not clear what a weapon is for, each side assumes the worst. In 1950, John H. Herz described exactly this uncertainty as the fundamental problem of the world of states.
04
The street and the parliament
Situation
The peace movement grows in West Germany. On October 22, 1983, according to estimates, several hundred thousand people demonstrate in the Hofgarten in Bonn, and around 1.3 million nationwide. On November 22, 1983, the Bundestag, the West German parliament, votes by a clear majority in favor of deployment. The next day, the Soviet Union breaks off the negotiations. Between 1983 and 1987, the missiles are deployed in Belgium, West Germany, Britain and Italy.
Link to the principle
The Security Dilemma has a momentum of its own. Each step can be justified individually, and yet the chain leads to a more dangerous situation than at the beginning. The breakdown of the talks shows how tight the spiral has become.
05
The way out
Situation
On December 8, 1987, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev sign the INF Treaty in Washington. Both sides give up all ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. For the first time, an entire class of weapons is abolished, verified by on-site inspections.
Link to the principle
The way out of the Security Dilemma is rarely more arms and usually more transparency. Inspections make visible what before could only be suspected. Only when both sides could verify each other’s intentions did the spiral unwind.
Key takeaways
Key lessons
01
Ask yourself what your protective measure looks like from the other side.
02
Others see your capabilities, not your intentions.
03
Link strength to a genuine offer to talk.
04
Assume that every step will trigger a response.
05
Create transparency if you want to get out of the spiral.
Summary
In Moscow, the Soviet SS-20s counted as modernization; in the West, as a threat. NATO responded in 1979 with the Double-Track Decision, and in Moscow the Pershing II counted as a first-strike weapon. Both sides acted out of concern for their own security and made the situation more dangerous. Only the INF Treaty of 1987, with mutual verification, broke the Security Dilemma.