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61Principle · Group 8

Security Dilemma

Security dilemma and arms races

“What you do to protect yourself, your counterpart may read as a threat – and then you arm each other into insecurity.”

If you want to protect yourself, you make yourself stronger.

Group 8: Interaction, Alliances and NegotiationT4 Political Prudence
Go to the in-depth section ↓
Two dots face each other; the left one draws a thin ring around itself, the right one answers with a thicker one, and with every ring the dots grow smaller and paler. At the turning point, a golden gate opens in the left ring, a golden line runs to the right dot, and both rings grow thinner.
In short

What you do to protect yourself, your counterpart may read as a threat – and then you arm each other into insecurity.

What it’s about: If you want to protect yourself, you make yourself stronger. The other side sees your new strength but not the intention behind it. Because a mistake would be costly, they assume the worst and follow suit. Their protection, in turn, becomes the new danger for you. This creates a spiral in which both sides end up less secure than before, even though neither wanted to attack.

In depth

The principle in detail

Three steps through the principle: grasp it, place it, put it to work. Open each topic on its own.

The core messageCore statement and 3 clarifications
In essence

Capabilities are visible, intentions are not. If you look only at your own intention, you overlook your own impact.

It does not say
That the other side is always harmless. Sometimes it really does have aggressive intentions, and then giving in encourages them.
It does not say
That protection is wrong. The point is to choose protection that doesn’t look like an attack.
It also says
A spiral can be broken when one side makes its intention visible and verifiable.
The explanationThe dilemma doesn’t need a villain.
  • The dilemma doesn’t need a villain.
  • It is enough that many means cut both ways: a camera can protect or surveil; a strong power base can provide security or smother others.
  • If you see the means, you cannot say for sure what it is for.
The question

How does what you do to protect yourself look from the outside?

The signs3 signs when you heed it · 3 when you overlook it
When you heed it
  • Before you protect yourself, you ask how the measure will come across to the other side.
  • You state your reasons before anyone has to guess them.
  • Where mistrust grows, you offer transparency.
When you overlook it
  • You treat every measure the other side takes as proof of bad intentions.
  • You answer protection with more protection.
  • Conversations are replaced by copies, minutes and records.
The backgroundFrom John H. Herz’s essay “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma” (1950). · T4 Political Prudence
  1. 1950
    OriginJohn H. Herz

    Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma

  2. 1951
    SupplementedHerbert Butterfield

    History and Human Relations

  3. 1978
    SupplementedRobert Jervis

    Cooperation under the Security Dilemma

  4. Tradition T4
    TraditionPolitical Prudence

    Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, Baltasar Gracián

    See the tradition on the Origin page
Read more: the full background

From John H. Herz’s essay “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma” (1950). Supplemented by Herbert Butterfield’s “History and Human Relations” (1951) and Robert Jervis’s “Perception and Misperception in International Politics” (1976) and “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” (1978); the idea can already be found in Thucydides.

The research4 sources: 3 theories, 1 review · 1950–1997 · with limitations of the research
4 sources1950–1997 period3 theories1 review
Strength of evidence
  1. weak
  2. moderate
  3. strong

The principle is a well-developed theory of international politics; the sources cited do not measure it, and transferring it to everyday leadership is an argument by analogy.

  1. 1950
    Theory
    John H. Herz

    “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma” (World Politics): coins the term; if you guarantee your security through your own power, you unsettle the others.

  2. 1951
    Theory
    Herbert Butterfield

    “History and Human Relations”: describes an irreducible dilemma of fear.

  3. 1978
    Theory
    Robert Jervis

    “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” (World Politics): cooperation is more likely when exploitation yields little and cooperation yields a lot; the dilemma weakens when the defense has the advantage and can be distinguished from the offense.

  4. 1997
    Review
    Charles L. Glaser

    “The Security Dilemma Revisited” (World Politics): the dilemma explains competition between states with compatible goals; its strength depends on the balance between offense and defense.

Where the research reaches its limits
  • Not every conflict is a security dilemma.
  • Robert Jervis distinguishes the spiral model, in which concessions and confidence-building help, from the deterrence model, in which concessions encourage an aggressor; from the outside, it is often unclear which case applies.
  • The sources deal with states.
  • It is plausible that the same spiral plays out between departments, companies or family members, but this has not been measured.
Read more: what research shows

John H. Herz coined the term in 1950: where no higher order provides protection, states can guarantee their security only through their own power, and that is exactly what unsettles the others. Around the same time, the historian Herbert Butterfield spoke of an irreducible dilemma of fear. In 1978, Robert Jervis used the prisoner’s dilemma to work out the principle. In his view, the dilemma is sharpest when the offense has the advantage and offensive and defensive weapons cannot be told apart; it weakens when the defense is superior and recognizable as such. In 1997, Charles L. Glaser reexamined this body of work: the dilemma explains how states with compatible goals nevertheless end up in competition and war. Applying it to companies, families and churches is an extrapolation, not a measurement.

The related principles60 Balance of Power · 62 Tit for Tat · 68 Escalation Ladder · 86 Unintended Consequences
Balance of Power

The dilemma is often set off by 60 Balance of Power (if you want to restore the balance, you build up arms)

Tit for Tat

62 Tit for Tat shows how responding wisely and forgiving quickly stop the spiral

Escalation Ladder

68 Escalation Ladder describes how the spiral drives a conflict upward rung by rung

Unintended Consequences

86 Unintended Consequences shows how protection creates the danger it is meant to avert

Read more: the full text

The dilemma is often set off by 60 Balance of Power (if you want to restore the balance, you build up arms); 62 Tit for Tat shows how responding wisely and forgiving quickly stop the spiral. 68 Escalation Ladder describes how the spiral drives a conflict upward rung by rung, and 86 Unintended Consequences shows how protection creates the danger it is meant to avert.

The action steps5 things you can actually do

  1. Take your most recent protective measure and describe it the way the other side sees it, without your reasons.

  2. State your intention before you act. If people encounter the measure first and hear the explanation only afterward, they are less likely to believe it.

  3. Choose means that clearly look like protection and are poorly suited to attack, such as an open rule for everyone instead of a secret folder.

  4. Offer verification: let the other side see what you are doing, and ask for the same in return.
  5. Before you give in, check whether the other side is afraid or is pursuing goals that your giving in would reward. Get a second opinion on this.
The reflection questions3 questions: Which of your safeguards could someone read as preparation for an attack?
  1. Which of your safeguards could someone read as preparation for an attack?
  2. Where do you interpret a measure taken by the other side as a sign of bad intentions without having asked?
  3. Who could you give a clear view of what you are doing this week, so that a spiral never gets started?

Take your time with one question. Write down your answer – or talk it over with someone you trust.

To finish
The picture to rememberThe animation once more, with an explanation
  1. Two dots face each other
  2. The left one draws a thin ring around itself, the right one answers with a thicker one, and with every ring the dots grow smaller and paler
  3. At the turning point, a golden gate opens in the left ring, a golden line runs to the right dot, and both rings grow thinner
Strategy Check

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In context

Group 8: Interaction, Alliances and Negotiation

Guiding question: How do you act when others are in the game too?

Stage 4 of 5: Act with others

Where the 92 principles come from: eight traditions of strategy, from classical war theory to dealing with uncertainty.

More about the origin

Background: WEGVISOR’s own selection from the strategy literature · More about the origin

Examples

The principle in practice

From the different spheres of society.

Government

The NATO Double-Track Decision and the Security Dilemma

In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union deploys new intermediate-range missiles; in 1979, NATO responds with the decision to station missiles of its own in Western Europe. Each side sees its own steps as protection and those of the other as preparation for an attack.

Security Dilemma
Education

The Sputnik Crisis and the Security Dilemma

In October 1957, the Soviet Union sends the first artificial satellite into space. The United States reads it as a military threat and responds in 1958 with an education law that makes mathematics and science a matter of national security.

Security Dilemma
Culture & Sports

The Festina Affair and the Security Dilemma

In July 1998, customs officers find large quantities of doping products in the car of a staff member of the Festina cycling team. The affair reveals how teams had been locked in an arms race with one another: anyone who wanted to ride clean feared having no chance against the others.

Security Dilemma
Government

Movie: The Hunt for Red October

A Soviet submarine commander wants to defect to the United States with the most modern boat in his fleet. Both superpowers set their fleets in motion, and each takes the other’s maneuvers for the prelude to an attack.

Security Dilemma
FAQ

Questions about the Security Dilemma

What does the Security Dilemma say?

What one side does to protect itself, the other perceives as a threat. Both arm in response and end up less secure, even though neither wanted to attack.

Where does the Security Dilemma come from?

John H. Herz coined the term in 1950. Herbert Butterfield described the idea at almost the same time, and Robert Jervis later developed it further.

What are some examples?

The NATO Double-Track Decision of 1979, the Sputnik crisis of 1957 and the Festina affair of 1998. In film, “The Hunt for Red October” shows it.

How well is the Security Dilemma supported by research?

Evidence: moderate – the principle is a well-developed theory of international politics; the sources cited do not measure it, and transferring it to everyday leadership is an argument by analogy.

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