The principle in detail
Three steps through the principle: grasp it, place it, put it to work. Open each topic on its own.
The core messageCore statement and 3 clarifications
Starting friendly, answering betrayal and forgiving quickly make you predictable. Then taking advantage doesn’t pay.
- It does not say
- That you should repay like for like until one side gives up. The response is short and ends as soon as the other person cooperates again.
- It does not say
- That the rule holds everywhere. In a one-time encounter, it has no basis.
- It also says
- An accident is not a betrayal. If you answer every misunderstanding harshly, you set off an echo of retaliation.
The explanationIf you are only friendly, you invite exploitation.
The attitude works because it avoids two mistakes.
- If you are only friendly, you invite exploitation.
- If you are only tough, you block every way back.
But it holds only where you will meet again.
Who do you deal with again and again, and how did you respond to their last mistake?
The signs3 signs when you heed it · 3 when you overlook it
- Newcomers get trust from you up front.
- You raise a breach of trust soon and clearly.
- Anyone who proves reliable again notices that, for you, the matter is closed.
- You wait until others have earned your trust.
- Mistakes go unspoken, or you are still bringing them up years later.
- Between two departments, every favor is counted and offset against the next.
The backgroundTradition T5 Game Theory, Negotiation and Conflict
- 1971SupplementedRobert L. Trivers
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
- 1984OriginRobert Axelrod
The Evolution of Cooperation
- 1992SupplementedMartin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund
Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations
- Tradition T5TraditionGame Theory, Negotiation and Conflict
Thomas C. Schelling, Robert Axelrod, Herman Kahn, Roger Fisher and William Ury
See the tradition on the Origin page
Read more: the full background
From Robert Axelrod’s book “The Evolution of Cooperation” (1984), which evaluates his computer tournaments from around 1980; the winning rule came from Anatol Rapoport. Supplemented by Robert L. Trivers (1971) and Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund (1992).
The research4 sources: 3 theories, 1 experiment · 1971–1992 · with limitations of the research
- weak
- moderate
- strong
Tournaments and models support the core well; applying the rule to cooperation between people is an extrapolation, and when errors occur, more generous variants do better.
- 1971Robert L. Trivers
“The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism”: mutual help as the basis of cooperation in nature.
- 1981Robert Axelrod and William D. Hamilton
“The Evolution of Cooperation” (Science): the strategy of reciprocity can also prevail in evolution.
- 1984Robert Axelrod
“The Evolution of Cooperation”: two computer tournaments on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma; both are won by “Tit for Tat,” the simplest program submitted. Cooperation based on reciprocity holds if the shadow of the future is long enough.
- 1992Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund
“Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations” (Nature): in mixed populations with errors, Tit for Tat sets cooperation in motion and then gives way to a more generous strategy.
- Tit for Tat is vulnerable to misunderstandings: after a single error, an endless echo of mutual retaliation can arise.
- In a world with errors, more generous variants that occasionally forgive even a defection do better.
- The principle applies only to repeated encounters.
- The evidence comes from tournaments and models, not from measurements in teams.
- Ethically, the Christian tradition in particular demands more than reciprocity: forgiveness that keeps no score.
Read more: what research shows
Around 1980, Robert Axelrod invited experts to submit programs for the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. In two tournaments, the simplest program won: “Tit for Tat” by Anatol Rapoport. It starts by cooperating, answers defection on the next move and then forgives completely. According to Robert Axelrod, cooperation based on reciprocity can emerge and remain stable if the shadow of the future is long enough; with William D. Hamilton, he showed in 1981 that the strategy can also prevail in evolution. In 1971, Robert L. Trivers had described mutual help as the basis of cooperation in nature. In 1992, Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund found in models with errors that Tit for Tat sets cooperation in motion and then gives way to a more generous strategy.
The related principles57 Strategic Interdependence · 61 Security Dilemma · 63 Co-opetition · 64 Credible Commitment
The framework comes from 57 Strategic Interdependence (your best course of action depends on the other side)
61 Security Dilemma shows the spiral of mistrust that wise reciprocity can stop
63 Co-opetition needs it when rivals work together over many rounds
64 Credible Commitment is what makes the announced response to betrayal credible in the first place
Read more: the full text
The framework comes from 57 Strategic Interdependence (your best course of action depends on the other side); 61 Security Dilemma shows the spiral of mistrust that wise reciprocity can stop. 63 Co-opetition needs it when rivals work together over many rounds, and 64 Credible Commitment is what makes the announced response to betrayal credible in the first place.
The action steps5 action steps: In new relationships, extend a little trust up front and say what you expect in return.
In new relationships, extend a little trust up front and say what you expect in return.
- Respond to a breach of trust promptly, calmly and in proportion. An excessive response becomes a betrayal in its own right.
- Ask before you respond: was it deliberate or an accident?
- At the other person’s first good step, show that the matter is closed. Don’t dig up old mistakes.
- Make your pattern visible. If people know how you will react, they don’t need to test you.
The reflection questions3 questions: Who do you approach with caution, even though they have never given you reason to?
- Who do you approach with caution, even though they have never given you reason to?
- Which of someone else’s mistakes have you been carrying around with you for months?
- How would your team describe your pattern when someone breaks your trust?
Take your time with one question. Write down your answer – or talk it over with someone you trust.
The picture to rememberThe animation once more, with an explanation
- Two dots take turns sending arcs to each other
- Golden arcs make a line grow between them, a teal arc makes it buckle
- After a clear teal response and an immediate golden arc, the line straightens and branches out in gold, while a second pair below, after the first break, only exchanges pale arcs and lets nothing grow between them
How the principle shows up in practice
Axelrod’s tournament, around 1980
In the contest between computer programs, the simplest one, Tit for Tat, wins twice. It starts friendly, answers betrayal and forgives immediately.
Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1963
Kennedy unilaterally announces a halt to nuclear tests in the atmosphere, as long as others follow suit. Khrushchev reciprocates, and the test ban treaty follows.
Hatfields and McCoys, 1863–1891
The feud shows what becomes of retaliation without forgiveness: more than a dozen dead.
How quickly do you forgive?
Get your profile across all 12 groups in about 10 to 15 minutes.
Start the Strategy CheckGroup 8: Interaction, Alliances and Negotiation
Guiding question: How do you act when others are in the game too?
Stage 4 of 5: Act with others
- TraditionGame Theory, Negotiation and Conflict
Thomas C. Schelling, Robert Axelrod, Herman Kahn, Roger Fisher and William Ury
- Related principles
Where the 92 principles come from: eight traditions of strategy, from classical war theory to dealing with uncertainty.
More about the originBackground: WEGVISOR’s own selection from the strategy literature · More about the origin