The principle in detail
Three steps through the principle: grasp it, place it, put it to work. Open each topic on its own.
The core messageCore statement and 3 clarifications
The outcome of your actions also depends on the actions of others, who in turn take their cue from you. Good strategy factors in the response.
- It does not say
- That the others look out only for their own advantage. People also decide on the basis of fairness, conscience and history.
- It does not say
- That every situation is a game against an opponent. Natural events don’t respond to your move, and neither does anyone when you are a small player in a very large market.
- It also says
- A state in which everyone has chosen the best response to the others can be bad for all of them. Then it helps to change the rules of the game itself.
The explanationHow the principle works and what matters
If you understand mutual dependence, you can shape it: change incentives, make commitments credible, build trust through repeated encounters.
Before every important step, it is therefore worth asking: what will the others do if I do this, and what will they do if they know I think this way?
The signs3 signs when you heed it · 3 when you overlook it
- Before important decisions, you think through how colleagues, customers or competitors will respond.
- You talk to those affected before things escalate.
- You look for ways to change incentives so that cooperation pays off for everyone.
- You plan as if the others would stand still, and their reaction takes you by surprise.
- You assume they act only out of self-interest.
- You remain stuck with others in a bad situation because any single attempt to break out seems risky.
The backgroundFrom John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s work “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” (1944).
- 1944OriginJohn von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
- 1950SupplementedJohn Nash
Doctoral dissertation at Princeton
- 1960SupplementedThomas C. Schelling
The Strategy of Conflict
- Tradition T5TraditionGame Theory, Negotiation and Conflict
Thomas C. Schelling, Robert Axelrod, Herman Kahn, Roger Fisher and William Ury
See the tradition on the Origin page
Read more: the full background
From John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s work “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” (1944). Supplemented by John Nash’s equilibrium (1950) and Thomas C. Schelling’s “The Strategy of Conflict” (1960).
The research4 sources: 2 classics, 1 theory, 1 primary study · 1944–2012 · with limitations of the research
- weak
- moderate
- strong
The mutual dependence of decisions is the mathematically developed foundation of game theory; however, the models often fail to predict precisely how people actually behave within it.
- 1950John Nash
Doctoral dissertation at Princeton: the equilibrium in which everyone has chosen the best response to the strategies of the others and no one can do better alone.
- 2012Martijn J. van den Assem, Dennie van Dolder and Richard H. Thaler
“Split or Steal?”: 574 contestants on the game show “Golden Balls,” with average stakes of more than $20,000; 52.8% split, even though stealing never does worse.
- The principle assumes that the others perceive your moves and can respond to them.
- In very large markets where you are only a small player, or in the face of natural events, there is no opponent.
- Many models assume rational players; real people often act differently.
- The analysis of “Golden Balls” also found little evidence that contestants split only when they expected the other person to do the same.
- If you only calculate and don’t understand what the other person feels and has learned, you will be wrong even with the best model.
Read more: what research shows
In 1838, Antoine Augustin Cournot studied how two suppliers adjust their quantities to each other without colluding. In 1944, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern described economic behavior as a game in which everyone has to factor in the decisions of the others. In 1950, John Nash developed the equilibrium that bears his name today, for any number of players: a state in which each player has chosen the best response to the moves of the others. In 1960, Thomas C. Schelling applied this thinking to deterrence and negotiation. An analysis by Martijn J. van den Assem, Dennie van Dolder and Richard H. Thaler shows how people actually decide: in 287 episodes of the game show “Golden Balls,” 52.8% of contestants chose to split, even though stealing never does worse. So people cooperate more often than pure theory would lead you to expect.
The related principles16 Know the Enemy and Yourself · 61 Security Dilemma · 62 Tit for Tat · 64 Credible Commitment
To go deeper, see 62 Tit for Tat (how mutual dependence turns into cooperation in repeated encounters) and 64 Credible Commitment (how you deliberately change what others expect)
16 Know the Enemy and Yourself provides the knowledge without which you cannot estimate how others will respond
61 Security Dilemma shows how mutual dependence without trust leads into a spiral
Read more: the full text
To go deeper, see 62 Tit for Tat (how mutual dependence turns into cooperation in repeated encounters) and 64 Credible Commitment (how you deliberately change what others expect). 16 Know the Enemy and Yourself provides the knowledge without which you cannot estimate how others will respond; 61 Security Dilemma shows how mutual dependence without trust leads into a spiral.
The action steps5 things you can actually do
Before an important decision, write down whom it affects and how each of them is likely to respond.
- Think one step further: what will the others do if they know that you think this way?
- Don’t factor in self-interest alone. Ask what fairness, history and conscience will do on the other side.
If you are stuck with others in a situation that is bad for everyone, look for rules that make breaking out safer for all: binding agreements, shared goals, repeated encounters.
- Make commitments that others can rely on. Then they will plan with you instead of against you.
The reflection questions3 questions: In which decision over the coming weeks have you not yet factored in how the others will respond?
- In which decision over the coming weeks have you not yet factored in how the others will respond?
- Where are you stuck with others in a situation that is bad for everyone and that nobody wants to leave alone?
- What would have to change in the rules for cooperation to pay off for everyone?
Take your time with one question. Write down your answer – or talk it over with someone you trust.
The picture to rememberThe animation once more, with an explanation
- Two teal circles face each other, each with a short line like a lever
- When the left one throws its lever, new dots light up on the right and the right circle turns toward them, then the other way around
- An arc runs back and forth between the two until it closes into a ring, and when both throw their levers at the same time, a golden dot appears in the middle that neither could have created alone
How the principle shows up in practice
John Nash
In 1950, a young mathematician at Princeton shows how to describe situations in which every strategy makes sense only as a response to the strategies of the others. In 1994, he receives the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for it.
Golden Balls
On a British game show, two contestants decide in secret between splitting and stealing. Just over half split, even though the math favors stealing.
MAN and the trucks cartel
A leniency program turns a cartel into a prisoner’s dilemma. MAN talks first and escapes a fine of about €1.2 billion.
What response are you counting on?
Get your profile across all 12 groups in about 10 to 15 minutes.
Start the Strategy CheckGroup 8: Interaction, Alliances and Negotiation
Guiding question: How do you act when others are in the game too?
Stage 4 of 5: Act with others
- Anchor principle of the group
It underlies every principle in the group: alliances, negotiation and escalation all follow from the fact that your best move depends on the moves of others.
The other 12 principles in the group build on it.
- TraditionGame Theory, Negotiation and Conflict
Thomas C. Schelling, Robert Axelrod, Herman Kahn, Roger Fisher and William Ury
Where the 92 principles come from: eight traditions of strategy, from classical war theory to dealing with uncertainty.
More about the originBackground: WEGVISOR’s own selection from the strategy literature · More about the origin