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15Principle · Group 2

Logistics

Logistics and strategy

“What you cannot supply, you cannot sustain; that is why supply sets the limit of every strategy.”

Every strategy needs people, materials and means in the right place at the right time.

Group 2: Forces and ResourcesT1 Classical Theory of War
Go to the in-depth section ↓
On the left a teal circle as the depot, on the right a line as the front, and between them a track along which golden dots travel; the front advances, the track grows longer, the dots arrive less and less often, and the line fades. Then a mist-blue ring encloses a circle, and golden dots land on it from above at a steady rhythm until the circle shines again and the ring dissolves.
In short

What you cannot supply, you cannot sustain; that is why supply sets the limit of every strategy.

What it’s about: Every strategy needs people, materials and means in the right place at the right time. What does not arrive cannot have an effect, no matter how good the plan is. In stories about strategy, the bold plan and the clever decision usually take center stage. How all of it is supplied is often left out. Yet every step forward lengthens the distance the supplies have to travel.

In depth

The principle in detail

Three steps through the principle: grasp it, place it, put it to work. Open each topic on its own.

The core messageCore statement and 3 clarifications
In essence

A venture reaches only as far as its supply. The question “How does it get there?” belongs right next to the question “What do we want to achieve?” from the very start.

It does not say
That good logistics wins on its own. It makes a strategy possible but does not replace it.
It does not say
That more material achieves more. Rhythm, routes and responsibilities often matter more than quantity.
It also says
If you secure your own supply, you can win with it without being the stronger side.
The explanationLogistics limits how far a venture can go.
  • Logistics limits how far a venture can go.
  • It is a matter of organization, because rhythm, routes and clear responsibilities matter more than quantity.
  • And it can be a strategy in itself.
The question

How does what is needed get to where it is needed?

The signs3 signs when you heed it · 3 when you overlook it
When you heed it
  • Before a venture starts, it is clear where the time, people and money will come from.
  • Someone is explicitly responsible for supply.
  • You only promise what you can actually deliver.
When you overlook it
  • Projects start with momentum and stall after a few weeks.
  • People work on new ventures in their free time because no one has freed them up.
  • Customers receive promises the warehouse cannot keep.
The backgroundFrom Martin van Creveld’s “Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton” (1977). · T1 Classical Theory of War
  1. 1977
    OriginMartin van Creveld

    Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton

  2. Tradition T1
    TraditionClassical Theory of War

    Carl von Clausewitz, Antoine-Henri Jomini, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, Frederick William Lanchester

    See the tradition on the Origin page
Read more: the full background

From Martin van Creveld’s “Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton” (1977). Supplemented by the concept of logistics, which Antoine-Henri Jomini introduced into military theory in the 19th century.

The research2 sources: 2 classics · 1834–1977 · with limitations of the research
2 sources1834–1977 period2 classics
Strength of evidence
  1. weak
  2. moderate
  3. strong

A broad historical study spanning three centuries supports the statement; nothing is measured, and some of its theses are disputed.

  1. 1834
    Classic
    Carl von Clausewitz

    “On War” (in German), Book VII, Chapter 4: an attack grows weaker, among other reasons, because it has to occupy the territory behind it and moves away from its sources of reinforcement.

  2. 1977
    Classic
    Martin van Creveld

    “Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton”: the supply, transport and administration of armies over three centuries; many advances and standstills can be explained only by supply.

Where the research reaches its limits
  • Good logistics alone wins nothing; it makes a strategy possible but does not replace it.
  • If you look only at supply, you become too cautious and miss opportunities that could have been seized with a little risk.
  • Some of Martin van Creveld’s theses, for example on the importance of certain supply routes, are disputed among researchers.
  • The sources deal with armies; applying them to companies, families and churches is an inference.
Read more: what research shows

In “Supplying War” (1977), the military historian Martin van Creveld examined how armies were supplied from the Thirty Years’ War to the Second World War. He deals with movement, supply, transport and administration, which most histories of war pass over. His thesis: supply shaped what commanders could do more than most accounts admit. He asks, for example, why Napoleon succeeded in 1805 and failed in 1812, and whether the war in Europe could have ended in 1944. Carl von Clausewitz already counts the growing distance from the sources of reinforcement and the need to occupy the territory in the rear among the causes that weaken an attack. Antoine-Henri Jomini introduced the term “logistics” into military theory in the 19th century.

The related principles13 Culminating Point · 14 Overstretch · 18 Friction · 45 Preparation in Peacetime
Culminating PointOverstretch

Supply usually determines where an advance loses its strength, as 13 Culminating Point describes, and, as 14 Overstretch shows, overload often begins where supply does not grow along with the venture

FrictionPreparation in Peacetime

Roads, weather and small mishaps, as 18 Friction describes, hit supplies first, and, as 45 Preparation in Peacetime makes clear, supply systems can be built only before the crisis

Read more: the full text

Supply usually determines where an advance loses its strength, as 13 Culminating Point describes, and, as 14 Overstretch shows, overload often begins where supply does not grow along with the venture. Roads, weather and small mishaps, as 18 Friction describes, hit supplies first, and, as 45 Preparation in Peacetime makes clear, supply systems can be built only before the crisis.

The action steps5 things you can actually do
  1. For every new venture, ask first: what does it need every week in time, people, materials and money, and where will that come from?

  2. Make someone explicitly responsible for supply, not as a side job.

  3. Check whether rhythm and routes are right. Often what is missing is not the quantity but the connection.
  4. Watch for the inconspicuous bottlenecks: the one approval, the one person at the transfer point, the material no one thinks of.
  5. Only promise what you can actually deliver. When the venture grows, check first whether supply is growing with it.
The reflection questions3 questions: Which venture have you launched without freeing up time and people for it?
  1. Which venture have you launched without freeing up time and people for it?
  2. Who is responsible for supply in your area, and do they know it?
  3. Which promise have you made that you cannot be sure of keeping?

Take your time with one question. Write down your answer – or talk it over with someone you trust.

To finish
The picture to rememberThe animation once more, with an explanation
  1. On the left a teal circle as the depot, on the right a line as the front, and between them a track along which golden dots travel
  2. The front advances, the track grows longer, the dots arrive less and less often, and the line fades
  3. Then a mist-blue ring encloses a circle, and golden dots land on it from above at a steady rhythm until the circle shines again and the ring dissolves
Strategy Check

How do the necessary things get there?

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In context

Group 2: Forces and Resources

Guiding question: Where do you commit your forces, and how long will they last?

Stage 3 of 5: Choose the path

Where the 92 principles come from: eight traditions of strategy, from classical war theory to dealing with uncertainty.

More about the origin

Background: WEGVISOR’s own selection from the strategy literature · More about the origin

Examples

The principle in practice

From the different spheres of society.

Government

Napoleon Bonaparte, the Russian Campaign and Logistics

In June 1812 Napoleon Bonaparte marches into Russia with hundreds of thousands of soldiers. In the very first weeks, long before the first major battle, tens of thousands die of disease and exhaustion because supplies cannot keep up. In the end, only a small fraction of the Grande Armée returns.

Logistics
FamilyBusiness

Nathan Mayer Rothschild, Wellington’s Payroll and Logistics

In 1814 the Duke of Wellington’s army stands at the Pyrenees and urgently needs cash to pay its soldiers. The British government commissions the banker Nathan Mayer Rothschild, who, together with his brothers, buys up coins across Europe and gets them to Wellington.

Logistics
Government

The Berlin Airlift and Logistics

In June 1948 the Soviet Union blocks all land and water routes to West Berlin. The Western Allies respond not with tanks but with aircraft. For almost 11 months they supply a city of more than two million people from the air.

Logistics
Government

Movie: Lawrence of Arabia

In David Lean’s film, T. E. Lawrence wants to strengthen the Arab revolt against the Ottomans. His boldest plan, taking the port of Aqaba from the landward side, serves one purpose above all: improving the revolt’s supply.

Logistics
FAQ

Questions about Logistics

What does the principle of Logistics say?

Every strategy holds only as far as people, materials and means can be supplied. What does not arrive cannot have an effect, and if you secure your supply, you can even use it as a strategy.

Where does the principle of Logistics come from?

Antoine-Henri Jomini introduced the term into military theory. The definitive account is Martin van Creveld’s “Supplying War” (1977), which examines how armies were supplied from the Thirty Years’ War to 1945.

What are some examples of Logistics as a principle?

Napoleon’s Russian campaign of 1812 failed not least because of supply, in 1814 the Rothschilds used a Europe-wide network to obtain cash for Wellington’s army, and the Berlin Airlift of 1948–49 made a blockade ineffective.

How well is Logistics supported by research?

Evidence: moderate – a broad historical study spanning three centuries supports the statement; nothing is measured, and some of its theses are disputed.

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