The principle in detail
Three steps through the principle: grasp it, place it, put it to work. Open each topic on its own.
The core messageCore statement and 3 clarifications
A victory is a way station. Whether it was a success is shown by the situation afterward.
- It does not say
- That you should give in. Some conflicts require a clear defeat of the other side before a better state becomes possible.
- It does not say
- That “better” means the same thing for everyone. A better state for one side can be worse for others.
- It also says
- If you make maximum demands just because you can, you are often preparing the next conflict.
The explanationConflicts live on in memory.
Conflicts live on in memory.
People who can live with the outcome help sustain a peace. People who were humiliated wait for the chance to reverse it.
You almost always go on living with the other side afterward, as a colleague, customer, neighbor or family member. That is why the question of what comes after belongs at the beginning of a confrontation, not at its end.
What should things look like when this is over?
The signs3 signs when you heed it · 3 when you overlook it
- Before a tough negotiation, you ask what working together should look like afterward.
- You leave the other side a way to save face.
- After winning a dispute, you reach out to the other side.
- You plan up to the moment of victory and no further.
- Decisions that were forced through are slow-walked afterward.
- The losing side tells a completely different story about the outcome than you do.
The backgroundFrom Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s “Strategy” (1954). · T3 Indirect Strategy and Maneuver
- 1954OriginBasil Henry Liddell Hart
Strategy
- 1971SupplementedFred Charles Iklé
Every War Must End
- 1981SupplementedRoger Fisher and William Ury
Getting to Yes
- 2010SupplementedGideon Rose
How Wars End
- Tradition T3TraditionIndirect Strategy and Maneuver
Basil Henry Liddell Hart, John Richard Boyd, Edward N. Luttwak, André Beaufre
See the tradition on the Origin page
Read more: the full background
From Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s “Strategy” (1954). Supplemented by the work of Fred Charles Iklé and Gideon Rose on how wars end and by the negotiation approach of Roger Fisher and William Ury.
The research5 sources: 2 theories, 2 case studies, 1 classic · 1954–2010 · with limitations of the research
- weak
- moderate
- strong
Historical case analyses and a widely used approach to negotiation support the idea, but it has not been measured; Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s own credibility is disputed.
- 1971Fred Charles Iklé
“Every War Must End”: governments plan how wars begin and how they are waged, but hardly how they end.
- 1981Roger Fisher and William Ury
“Getting to Yes”: look for solutions that protect the interests of both sides and preserve the relationship.
- 1988John J. Mearsheimer
“Liddell Hart and the Weight of History”: Basil Henry Liddell Hart embellished his own influence on history after the fact.
- 2010Gideon Rose
“How Wars End”: the United States has repeatedly failed to plan adequately for the period after victory.
- “Better” depends on your vantage point, and Basil Henry Liddell Hart says so himself.
- The Marshall Plan, for instance, also deepened the division of Europe.
- Some conflicts require a clear defeat of the opponent before a better state becomes possible, as in 1945.
- That a victory without regard for what comes after “often” loses the peace rests on selected cases, not on a count.
- And John J. Mearsheimer showed that Basil Henry Liddell Hart embellished his own role.
Read more: what research shows
In “Strategy” (1954), Basil Henry Liddell Hart wrote, in essence, that the object in war is “a better state of peace,” even if only from your own point of view; that is why a war must be conducted with the desired peace in mind. In “Every War Must End” (1971), Fred Charles Iklé showed that governments put a great deal of effort into starting and waging wars but little into ending them. In “How Wars End” (2010), Gideon Rose described how, in the 20th and early 21st centuries, the United States repeatedly failed to plan adequately for the period after victory. In 1981, Roger Fisher and William Ury recommended solutions for negotiations that protect the interests of both sides and preserve the relationship. These are historical analyses and recommendations, not measurements.
The related principles01 Primacy of Purpose · 27 Victory without Fighting · 52 Golden Bridge · 86 Unintended Consequences
The principle is the touchstone for 01 Primacy of Purpose
27 Victory without Fighting shows that the best end state often arises when the opponent does not have to be destroyed at all
52 Golden Bridge makes a lasting peace easier by offering an honorable way out
86 Unintended Consequences reminds you that a victory can also make the situation afterward worse
Read more: the full text
The principle is the touchstone for 01 Primacy of Purpose; 27 Victory without Fighting shows that the best end state often arises when the opponent does not have to be destroyed at all, 52 Golden Bridge makes a lasting peace easier by offering an honorable way out, and 86 Unintended Consequences reminds you that a victory can also make the situation afterward worse.
The action steps5 action steps: Before every major confrontation, describe in three sentences the state you want afterward.
Before every major confrontation, describe in three sentences the state you want afterward.
Ask yourself what story the other side will tell about the outcome and whether you can live with it.
Drop demands that only humiliate and do nothing for the state afterward.
- Plan the time after the decision as carefully as the decision itself: Who will work with whom afterward, and what will that take?
After winning a dispute, be the first to reach out to the losing side.
The reflection questions3 questions: Which dispute did you win while losing something you need today?
- Which dispute did you win while losing something you need today?
- What should things look like after the confrontation that lies ahead of you?
- What story will the other side tell about the outcome?
Take your time with one question. Write down your answer – or talk it over with someone you trust.
The picture to rememberThe animation once more, with an explanation
- Two circles pull on a line above a chasm
- The left one wins, the right one falls in, and mist-blue dots gather above the chasm into a dark cloud
- The image rewinds, and again the left circle wins, but this time a golden line pulls the right one out, together they lay a golden arch across the chasm, and the cloud dissolves
How the principle shows up in practice
The Marshall Plan, 1948
The United States invests about $13 billion in rebuilding Europe, including its former enemy, and ties the aid to cooperation.
The 1995 Rugby World Cup
At the final, Nelson Mandela wears the Springbok jersey of his former oppressors and turns the victory into a sign of reconciliation.
The Treaty of Versailles, 1919
The harsh peace, imposed without the defeated party, is experienced in Germany as a Diktat and exploited by the enemies of the republic – the counterexample to the Marshall Plan.
What should things look like afterward?
Get your profile across all 12 groups in about 10 to 15 minutes.
Start the Strategy CheckGroup 1: Purpose and Objective
Guiding question: What are you fighting for, and what should be left standing at the end?
Stage 1 of 5: Clarify
- TraditionIndirect Strategy and Maneuver
Basil Henry Liddell Hart, John Richard Boyd, Edward N. Luttwak, André Beaufre
Where the 92 principles come from: eight traditions of strategy, from classical war theory to dealing with uncertainty.
More about the originBackground: WEGVISOR’s own selection from the strategy literature · More about the origin